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THE FINAL FRONTIER: A VOYAGE REQUIRING A
WORLD ENTERPRISE

.

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the world has entered an unprecedented era
of international cooperation. The collapse of the philosophical conflict between
the West and the East has allowed the nations of the world to come together for
the benefit of mankind. Such collaboration has included preservation of both
international peace' and human rights,2 actions primarily centered around
maintaining the world's status quo. Can these nations now come together to pull
mankind, scientifically and technologically speaking, into the 21 st Century? The
area of scientific research where the most definitive answer to this question lies
and where the world stands to gain the most benefit from cooperative efforts is
perhaps the most pure international domain of all, "Space, the final frontier."

II.

THE BENEFITS OF SPACE EXPLORATION AND UTILIZATION

In a time when the entire world seems to be trying to make budget
reductions, one of the first cuts inevitably seems to be in the space program.'

1. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 is an example of the U.N. acting in the interest of international peace.
For many years, the efforts of the U.N. Security Council were hampered by the veto power of the five
permanent members; a veto most often exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union to frustrate each
other's goals. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-64 (1991). The
collapse of the philosophical conflict allowed the Security Council, for the first time since the Korean War, to
take major consolidated action to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Id. at 1293, 1317-1318.
2. Examples of U.N. humanitarian and peacekeeping actions include efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, and
Cambodia; William Pfaff, Somalia Spotlights U.N. Crisis, STAR TRm., Dec. 7, 1992, at 12A; and the protection
of the Kurds in northern Iraq. Denise Natali, Kurds in Northern Iraq Badly Need Help, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 12, 1993, at 19.
3. The U.S. space station, as originally conceptualized, was to carry a crew of eight. However, $8 billion
in budget cuts over the next five years forced the redesign of the station so that it would accommodate only
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The reason is simple; the average person, including an elected representative,
tends to feel that he receives no benefit from the space program unless he
actually gets to go into space. However, on further reflection, most people do
come to the realization that television broadcasting, global telecommunications
and meteorological forecasting, all products of space research,4 have direct
impacts on their daily lives. But, in the minds of most people, such limited
direct benefits do not justify the tremendous financial and technological
investment required for an aggressive space program. If such justification exists,
then it must come from the indirect benefits of the program.
Though most people are unaware of it, the indirect benefits of the space
program are present in almost every facet of daily life. The multitude of
disciplines required for space flight offers an eye-opening glimpse of this
pervasiveness. 5 Perhaps the single most persuasive example of space technology
reaching the average person is the personal computer. The need to process the
massive amounts of data incident to space flight led directly to the computer
age.6 Techniques developed for photographing objects from space are now
applied in medical x-rays to study circulatory disorders, brain tumors, and artery
damage.7 Space technology is finding applications in the management of
roadway and aviation traffic, medical monitoring, crime detection, industrial
controls, power generation, and banking!8 The derivatives of space technology
are not limited to merely the practical and necessary aspects of life. The
composite materials found in modem racquetball and tennis rackets, as well as
many other sporting goods, were originally developed for the space program.9
Given these indirect benefits, suddenly the allocation of billions of dollars to the
space program does not appear to be such a bad investment.
Other benefits also exist which relate to mankind's terrestrial life but on a
much wider scale. The use of satellite technology for studying the Earth, a
process known as remote sensing, has applications in a wide variety of forms.
Such technology is used in locating natural resources, in predicting crop yields,
in studying pollution, in mapping, in studying and charting oceanic and

four crewmen. Robert W. Stewart, NASA Chief Says Future Is Tied to U.S. Space Station, L.A. TIMES, June
25, 1992, at 20. It is unsurprising that so little concrete work has come from the space station project [which
is the usual justification for reducing appropriations to the project], when one considers the numerous times
the station has had to be redesigned in order to accommodate budget cuts.
In addition to the $8 billion in space station budgets cuts, the Clinton Administration plans on cutting
another $7.7 billion from other NASA programs over the next five years. See James R. Asker, Clinton Offers
$15 Billionfor NASA with R&D Boost, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 12, 1993, at 25-26.
For an update on the severity of NASA's continued financial woes, see James R. Asker, NASA's Budget
Woes Will Threaten Station: Never mind the space station, will there even be a National Aeronauticsand Space
Administrationfive years from now?, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1994, at 77.
4. R.C. Seamans, Jr., Returns From Space Exploration Overview on Space Achievements, in ORGANIZING
SPACE AcrvriEs FOR WORLD NEEDS 24 (Ernst A. Steinhoff ed., 1968).

5. Among the areas of expertise involved in spaceflight are hydraulics, electronics, mechanics,
metallurgy, aeronautics, chemistry, physics, dynamics, and fluid mechanics. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id. at 30-31.
8. Id. at 32-33.
9. See James F. Glass, Perspective On Space Exploration, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at 7.
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atmospheric patterns, and in a host of other manners.' Thus, space technology
plays a significant role in the enhancement of life for all mankind.
llL

THE ADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Space research has yielded tremendous dividends despite being carried on
by several separate entities who have only occasionally joined together in their
pursuits. Is there any real reason why the nations of the world should now break
from this trend and join together to form an International Space Agency (ISA)?
The simple answer is that cooperation and its conjunctive benefits are no longer
precluded by conflicting political ideals and military overtones. Thus, it is only
now that any advantages to cooperative efforts may be explored."
The first advantage to international cooperation is the elimination of
duplication of efforts in the interest of efficiency. 2 Duplicative efforts
unnecessarily waste natural, financial, and human resources, as well as time, in
order to derive the same answers to the same questions. These wastes could be
avoided by coordinating space research through an international space
organization. The resources saved may be applied to additional projects, thus
allowing both a greater number of projects and a greater commitment of
resources to each project.

10. MAN IN SPACE 214-17 (H.J.P. Arnold ed., 1993).
11. While some international cooperation in space is currently taking place, most efforts are only
piecemeal projects with the individual nations providing only discrete services (usually based on the nation's
lmufiosT specialized knowledge) to tht o trall effort. The ISA envisioned by iW-s wtlt 'wval be mvwt in
the nature of a multinational "corporation" whose board of directors happens to be national governments. The
purpose behind such a scheme is to place the space-faring nations and the NSFNs in positions of relative parity
with respect to management, responsibility, and potential return.
For an extensive discussion of the implications of international cooperation in space, see generally Jos6
M. Filho, About the Legal Definition of InternationalCooperationin the Erplorationand Use of Outer Space,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 355-59 (1993) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE].

12. The following list is illustrative of the duplication of effort by the US aid USSR during the last four
decades:
Project
US
USSR
Initial Satellites
Explorer
Sputnik
Vanguard
Moon Probes
Ranger
Luna
Surveyor
Mars Probes
Mariner
Mars
Viking
Manned Orbiters
Mercury
Vostok
Gemini
Apollo
Soyuz
Space Stations
Skylab
Salyut
Mir
Reusable Orbiters
Space Shuttle
Buran
See generally MAN IN SPACE. supra note 10.
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A correlative benefit to eliminating duplicative efforts is the pooling of
intellect, facilities, and experience. With the top scientific minds of multiple
nations working on common goals, solutions to problems should be found more
expeditiously. By giving the ISA access to facilities in various nations, each3
nation is not required to build facilities to meet all of their individual needs.'
Furthermore, the experiences of the various nations could be applied to future
situations. As an example, the Russians could lend valuable insight regarding
extended stays in space from their Salyut and Mir programs to the Space Station
Freedom project.
A second benefit to international cooperation in space is the dispersion of
costs. As mentioned earlier, many nations are trying to cut their budgets, and
space programs are frequently among the first programs placed on the chopping
block. With the ISA, each nation does not have to meet the entire cost of every
project. Rather, each nation would only need to contribute a portion of the
funding for each project.' 4 Simple mathematics illustrates the economy of a
joint approach. Assume a space goal requires the investment of 100 monetary
units. Each of two nations contributes 100 units to their separate space programs
and each reaches the goal. In reaching the goal, the two entities have expended
a total of 200 units. Now assume that the two nations each contribute seventyfive units to a joint space program. The ISA receives 150 units and after
expending 100 units to reach the goal, has fifty additional units for other
projects. Furthermore, since each partner only contributed seventy-five units,
each nation in effect has twenty-five additional units to be used at the domestic
level.
The dispersion of liability15 for damage resulting from space activity
provides a third reason for international cooperation. The reasoning is the same
as that for the dispersion of costs; each nation need not contribute as much to
settle a liability incurred by the ISA, as it would if each member operated
independently.
The fourth major reason for forming an international space agency is that
the legal regime covering space related activities is in great need of improvement.' 6 The ISA could develop a comprehensive and evolutionary system of

13. Consider a space program's need for worldwide tracking stations, research facilities, and launch and
mission control facilities. The same argument can be extended to the tracking and data relay system satellites
[TDRS] used by the U.S. for navigation and positioning of space vehicles.
14. Admittedly, there will be substantial bureaucratic costs in terms of both man hours and financial
resources. However, these are factors associated with any cooperative effort, international or otherwise, and
they would be more than offset by the benefits to be had. Furthermore, the bureaucratic interaction would be
only at the highest levels of the agency's management and would thus, have very little impact on the daily
operation of the agency. See infra parts V.B.3-5.
15. Under one current space treaty, a nation is held to strict liability for terrestrial damage and fault
liability for extraterrestrial damage resulting from its space activities. Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, arts. II, Hl, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Treaty].
16. The U.N.'s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has led the way in the
development of space law. while the ISA would not displace COPUOS entirely, by having the institution most
involved in space activity also involved in the formation of space law, the principles so derived would not arise
purely in the abstract but would rather have a foundation in concrete situations. COPUOS would still retain

1994]

FINAL FRONTIER

law, which would represent the interests of the major space faring nations, as
well as those nations seeking access to space. Among the legal issues that need
to be addressed in the near future are the development of a binding and
compulsory forum for dispute resolution, 7 the development of a system of
environmental protection regutations,"8 the development of a system regutating
the use of nuclear power in space, 9 and the resolution of the dispute over
sovereignty regarding geostationary orbital positions.2"
The final two reasons for worldwide cooperation in space are related to
improving international intercourse. First, the ISA would lead to increased
participation in space programs.2' While many nations currently participate in
space agreements with the major space powers, such agreements are usually
directed toward a need of the space power with only incidental benefits to the
assisting nation.22 Under the ISA, these assisting nations would have an input

paxticipating ini any
a vital role in reprexntin tt natiotis tnot wmtolved in the IS., particularly thme taot
space activity, in terms of their relationship to those nations which are engaging in space activity through the
formulation of treaties covering such topics as liability for damage as a result of the space activity of other
nations. See infra part IV.
See generally Karl-Heinz Bickstiegel, Developing a System of Dispute Settlement Regarding Space
Activities, PROCEEDINGS ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 11, at 27-35.
17. Several space treaties establish liability for damage resulting from space activities, but none of these
agreements establishes a forum or system for dispute resolution. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, arts. VI-VII, 18 U.S.T. 2411 [hereinafter Space Treaty] and Liability Treaty, supra note 15.
18. These regulations are needed to protect both the earth's environment from damage from space-related
activities as well as the space environment. A major issue revolves around the use of space as a commons for
waste disposal. At first glance, it seems that space would be a limitless receptacle for waste disposal,
particularly if waste was to be placed on a trajectory out of the solar system or into the sun, but the solution
is not so simple. This same vasuzX atStasdt sgasding the setmisnZy Uimitltss =ZS of ft earkh which cml
be used for waste disposal has led to many of the severe environmental problems that mankind faces today.
19. Nuclear power use in space has already generated a significant controversy. In 1978, a Soviet nuclear
powered satellite, COSMOS 954, reeatered the earth's atmosphere, broke up, and scattered radioactive debris
over a significant portion of northern Canada. MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 122.
Banning the use of nuclear power in space does not present an acceptable solution however. The coming
space research programs, such as the Mission to Mars, will require vast amounts of power, amounts which only
nuclear power sources can provide.
20. The conflicting positions on this issue are: 1) the general principle from space law which states that
space is the common province of all mankind; Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. II; and 2) the claims of
equatorial nations that the geostationary orbits are a natural resource subject to national sovereignty; see THE
BOGOTA DECLARATION, DEC. 3, 1976, reprinted in CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 891-96 (1982).
21. The concept of increasing international participation in space involves an interesting twist with regard
he
to the former Soviet Union. Due to the ctollapse of the USSR, the txtensive Sfit space pmgrm has
scattered among a host of nations, most of whom are unable to effectively utilize those space related properties.
An international space organization nay be the only way to again reach the full potential and value of those
sites. See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Towards a European Space Agency, Mark II?, PROCEEDINGS ON
Legal Regulations of
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 11, at 172-82. See also E. Kamentskaya et al.,
Space Activities in Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States, PROCEEDINGS ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE, supra note 11, at 86-90.

22. The United States launched the first international satellite in 1962 in conjunction with the United
Kingdom. ROBIN KERROD, THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NASA 246 (1986), The U.S. has participated in
space related agreements with many nations including: Argentina, Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses
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in the formation of primary goals of space research without being forced to
develop their own complete space program, which in most cases would be
beyond the financial and technological capability of those nations.23 Second,
the formation of the ISA would provide a forum for greater dissemination of the
benefits of space research and its spin-offs. Thus, the ISA would bring more
nations into the scientific
process, both in the formulation of questions and in the
24
answers.
of
application
The ISA would be the ideal forum to meet the goals of cooperation and
mutual assistance. The ISA would provide extensive benefits to the space
powers as well as the non-space-faring nations [NSFNs]. 25 However, problems
and details concerning such an organization must also be considered. In

of Space, Aug. 6, 1991, U.S.-Arg., Hein's No. KAV 3020, Temp. State Dep't No. 91-184 [hereinafter Argentina
Agreement]; Australia, Agreement Concerning the Navstar Global Positioning System, Feb. 7, 1991, U.S.Austl., Hein's No. KAV 2856, Temp. State Dep't No. 91-77; Thailand, Agreement on Cooperation in Science
and Technology, Apr. 13, 1984, U.S.-Thail., T.I.A.S. No. 10,991; France, Agreement Concerning Emergency
Use of the Combined Forces Base at Hao, Sept. 6, 1984, U.S.-Fr., T.I.A.S. No. 11,163; Senegal, Agreement
Regarding the Establishment and Operation of a Space Vehicle Tracking and Communication Facility, Dec.
26, 1991, U.S.-Sen., Hein's No. KAV 3133, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-26 [hereinafter Senegal Agreement];
China, Memorandum of Agreement on Liability for Satellite Launches, Dec. 17, 1988, U.S.-P.R.C., 28 I.L.M.
609; Mongolia, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Collection of Radiometer Image Data,
Mar. 9, 1993, U.S.-Mong., Hein's No. KAV 3520 [hereinafter Mongolia Agreement]; and Ecuador, Agreement
Relating to Observation and Tracking of Satellites and Space Vehicles, Feb. 24, 1960, U.S.-Ecuador, 11 U.S.T.
179.
The former Soviet Union had entered into similar agreements including one establishing an astronaut
exchange program with several of its cold war allies. Agreement on Co-Operation in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, July 13, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter INTERCOSMOS Treaty]. See
also MAN tN SPACE, supra note 10, at 107-08. The Soviet Union has also participated in extensive cooperative
programs with Austria. W. Riedler, The Joint Austro-Soviet Space Project AUSTROMIR-91, SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 1993, at 175.
The most notable case where several nations have come together for a cooperative space program has
occurred in western Europe. Originally formed as the European Space Research Organization [ESRO];
Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Organization, June 14, 1962, 4 I.L.M. 306 [hereinafter
ESRO Treaty]; the organization changed its name to the European Space Agency [ESA] and its organizational
structure in 1975; Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, May 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
855 [hereinafter ESA Treaty].
On several occasions, broad multilateral treaties with a space component have been concluded to meet
certain needs such as global telecommunications. See e.g., Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for
a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 514 U.N.T.S. 25; Agreement Relating
to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "INTELSAT", Aug.20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813;
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "INTELSAT" Operating
Agreement, Aug.20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091.
23. For example, if a nation wished to have a satellite to obtain natural resources information, the nation
would have to construct the satellite, develop a launch vehicle and the attendant facilities, and develop a means
of data transmission and processing. Under the current state of affairs, the only alternative to developing an
entire space program for a non-space-faring nation is to purchase such services from a space power. See
Mongolia Agreement, supra note 22.
24. On a more philosophical note, an international organization with a purely scientific goal transcending
national boundaries may have the benefit of opening up international communications, bringing the nations of
the earth closer together in other respects.
25. The NSFNs would consist of all nations except the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, China, Italy, Germany, Canada, and Japan. These nations represent both those which would contribute
the majority of the financial support to the ISA and those which have the most advanced space programs.
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addressing those issues, the logical starting point is with the primary principles
of space law.

IV

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE LAW

Understanding the intricacies associated with an international space
organization requires a basic familiarity with the fundamental concepts of space
law. The foundations of space law are rooted in the United Nations (U.N.).
Under the U.N. Charter, members have expressed the purposes of maintaining
international peace26 and of achieving "international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character[.]" 27
The launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 prompted the U.N.
to take the initial step towards the formation of principles of space law. The
U.N. was guided by the precepts of peace and cooperation contained in the U.N.
Charter.2" In 1958, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1348 which
established the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS)2 9 for the purposes of promoting cooperation in outer space,30 of

exploring the possible legal problems relating to space activities," and for the
benefit of all mankind.32
The work of COPUOS led to the adoption of five principal treaties defining
the law of outer space: the Space Treaty, 33 the Rescue and Return Treaty,' the
Liability Treaty,35 the Registration Treaty,36 and the Moon Treaty.37 These
treaties establish several fundamental principles:

26. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
27. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
28.

ROBERT E. RiGGs & JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS 166 (1988).

29. G.A. Res. 1348, para. 1, reprintedin Henning K. Krakau & Andreas G. Wedel, UN-General Assembly
Resolutions 333-334 (1975).
30. Id. pmbl., para. 1(b).
31.

Id. para. 1(d).

32. Id.
33. Space Treaty, supra note 17.
34. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Treaty].
35. Liability Treaty, supra note 15.
36. Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter
Registration Treaty]. The purposes of the Registration Treaty are to facilitate operation of the Liability Treaty
and to minimize the potential of two objects being placed into conflicting orbits. It may seem that in the
vastness of outer space the likelihood of two objects colliding would be remote, however, the number of objects
launched into space is staggering; between 1958 and 1980 over 11,360 objects had left the Earth. Jochen
Pfeifer, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, ZEITSCHRIFT FUER LUFT UND
WELTRAUMECHT 215 (Sept. 1981).

37. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Nov. 12, 1979,
18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
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8
1) Space is to be used solely for peaceful purposes;
2) Space 39is the province of all mankind and not subject to national
appropriation;
3) The exploration and use of space shall be conducted in the spirit of
cooperation and mutual assistance; 4°
4)4 States are to bear liability for damage resulting from their activities in
space; '
5) The exploration and 42use of outer space is to be conducted in an
environmentally safe manner;
43
6) Space activity is governed by international law;
7) These principles apply to intergovernmental organizations as well as state
parties.'
These principles, which may be said to have risen to the level of customary
international law,45 define the primary rules of law that must govern the
exploration and exploitation of space. By virtue of the seventh principle, they
apply to any international organization to which the treaty parties are members.
Thus, these principles should be furthered by the ISA. Furthermore, it can be
seen that these treaties would not only form constraints on the ISA, but in fact,
an international space program is the only way to meet the obligations imposed
by these principles.
The ISA would also perform a reciprocal function by facilitating efficient
operation of the treaties. The ISA would further the principles of international
cooperation, especially in the area of dissemination of project results and
information, and of making space open to all of mankind. The dispute resolution
forum of the ISA 46 would be a tremendous aid in the administration of the

38.
39.
40.
Liability
41.

Space Treaty, supra note 17, arts. III, IV; Moon Treaty, supra note 37, arts. 2, 3.
Space Treaty, supra note 17, pmbl., art. II; Moon Treaty, supra note 37, arts. 4, 6, 11.
Space Treaty, supra note 17, pmbl., arts. III, V, vi, IX; Rescue and Return Treaty, supra note 34;
Treaty, supra note 15, art. XXI; Moon Treaty, supra note 37, art. 10.
Space Treaty, supra note 17, arts. VI, VII; Liability Treaty, supra note 15; Moon Treaty, supra note

37, art. 14.
42. Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. IX; Moon Treaty, supra note 37, art. 7. A lack of foresight is one

of the most significant reasons mankind is facing a myriad of environmental problems on earth, problems which
are the result of its actions, the consequences of which it failed to consider. With the relative pristine state of
the extra-terrestrial environment at stake, mankind has another chance to look before leaping. Just as
importantly, space activities can have an effect on the earth's environment, including damage to the ozone layer
from rocket exhaust and nuclear contamination. STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW 127-29

(1991).
Moon Treaty, supra note 37, art. 2.
43. Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. m11;

44. Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. XIII; Rescue and Return Treaty, supra note 34, art. 6; Liability
Treaty, supra note 15, art. XXII; Registration Treaty, supra note 36, art. VII; Moon Treaty, supra note 37, art.
16.
45. Principles can attain the status of customary international law where they demonstrate the requisite
opinio juris and practice. Although not every nation has accepted the principles of the treaties as law, opinio
juris is demonstrated by the fact that the vast majority of nations engaging in space activity have signed onto
the various treaties. The practice element is demonstrated, even though the treaties have been in existence for
a comparatively short period of time (less than thirty years), by the fact that the principles have existed for
most of the time that mankind has been involved in space activities.
46. See infra part V.B.14.
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Liability Treaty, and the provisions of the Rescue and Return Treaty would be
better facilitated by an agency with worldwide membership. Finally, the Moon
Treaty, the provisions of which space activities have yet to begin to truly
challenge, would also be better administered by a worldwide space agency.
Therefore, it can be seen that the various space treaties can only reach their full
potential by operating in conjunction with an ISA.
V

THE ISA

-

47
"ONE GIANT LEAP FOR MANKIND"

Having come to the conclusion that broad international cooperation in
space' presents the most practical solution to the problem of the world's
lagging space initiative, and having explored the international principles
regarding space activity which must govern the solution to that problem, the next
step is to decide "where" and "how" to organize such a cooperative effort.
"Where" is not used in a geographical sense, but in a political context. Can
existing political mechanisms accommodate the diverse issues surrounding
international space activity, or must the ISA develop a new infrastructure? The
real difficulty arises, however, in the "how" portion of the solution. In drafting
an agreement to form an international organization, particularly one in such a
high technology area as space activity, great care must be taken to balance the
goals and benefits of such an organization against the national rights and
interests of the various member states.
A.

The Political Setting

The political setting question is easily solved by reexamining the purposes
and benefits of the ISA. The overriding goals of the ISA are to increase
participation in space on a global level, to give the space powers a larger support
base, to increase efficiency through conjunctive actions, and to give the NSFNs
a greater role and interest in space activities. An organization with a relationship
to the U.N., such as a specialized agency, presents the most practical solution.
Such a relationship offers substantial benefits. First, in the event of a dispute
arising among member states, a tie to the U.N. presents access to the Internation-

47. The words spoken by Neil Armstrong as he stepped onto the lunar surface inJuly 1969 are, perhaps,
those most identified with space exploration. However, they could be no more appropriate to any endeavor
than they are to an attempt to bring mankind together on what would be the greatest voyage of all time and
to the challenges to be overcome. MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 74.
48. It is important to recognize that the ISA would not replace all domestic space activity. Private
corporations could be expected to compete with the ISA in the commercial exploitation of space.
Unfortunately, space technology is likely to also play a significant military role for some time. These military
uses include rocketry as a weapons delivery system and surveillance satellites. Furthermore,.it is also likely
that nations may want to individually pursue projects not on the ISA itinerary. Thus, organizations such as
NASA are not likely to be entirely replaced.
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al Court of Justice.49 Second, given the dual purpose use ° of the technologies
involved in space activity, the value of the Security Council in maintaining
international peace will be especially significant." Third and perhaps most
importantly, a relationship with the U.N. also brings with it a relationship to
specialized agencies, many of which have an interest in space activity. 2
B. The InternationalSpace Agency Treaty
As with any treaty designed to facilitate the aims of many nations, great
care must be taken in the drafting of the ISA Treaty. Each provision must
balance the interests and financial stake of the major space powers, without
whom such an agency cannot exist, against the interests of the NSFNs, who have
previously been unable to gain access to the benefits of space. The treaty should
cover as many specific details as possible, as well as providing guiding principles
to resolve unforeseen difficulties. 3
1. Purpose, Guiding Principles, and Legal Personality
The purpose provision of the ISA Treaty would provide the best opportunity
to lay down a concept governing the agency. Plainly stated, the ISA would
operate to facilitate international cooperation and promote respect for the rights
of other nations in the exploration and exploitation of space. To this end, the
treaty should provide that all agency actions should be consistent with the
interests of both the space powers. and the NSFNs. This declaration of purpose
must be supported by guiding principles paramount to any actions taken by the
agency, including its programs, operations, regulations, and decisions. These
49. This assumes the dispute would arise between nations. Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
Furthermore, member nations should be required in signing the ISA Treaty to agree to submit to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. See id. art. 36(2).
50. "Dual purpose use" refers to the ability of many of the technologies involved in space activity to be
applied in both civilian and military manners. See generally RONALD A. FINKLER ET AL., TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER IN A CHANGING NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (1990).

51. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. In this respect the ISA would be similarly situated to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Due to the usability of the technologies involved in both peaceful and military
methods, the Security Council would have to play a prominent role in the control of those technologies. See
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, arts. III, XI, 8 U.S.T. 1093. See also infra
part V.B.10.
52. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] operates to
disseminate all types of scientific information throughout the world. The International Civil Aviation
Organization [ICAO] would play a major role in defining the legal regulation of the aerospace plane. The
International Telecommunication Union [ITU], the World Meteorological Organization [WMO], and the
International Maritime Organization [IMO] all rely on satellites for data and communications. The World
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO].would provide an international forum for the registration of patents
covering the technologies involved. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] would play an important
regulatory role in the use of nuclear power in space. See generally STEPHEN S. GOODSPEED, THE NATURE AND
FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 420-65 (1967).
53. For an extensive discussion of the potential difficulties to be considered in drafting the ISA Treaty,
see generally FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING (1977).
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guiding principles may be included by incorporating the language of the
fundamental treaties of space law5 4 and fundamental precepts of international
law. The necessary principles of international law include the customary norms
of maintenance of international peace, recognition of space as the province of all
mankind, and its corollary, cooperation among nations in space.55
Finally, in order for the ISA to act under these principles and to conduct its
business, the ISA Treaty must establish the agency as an entity with legal
personality under international law. The statement of legal personality would
also facilitate other aspects of the operation of the ISA by allowing it to enter
into contracts, to maintain claims against its members, and to accept liability for
its actions.
2. Membership
The membership conditions of the ISA would present the first major
balancing test between the goals of the ISA and the principles of international
law. A major purpose of the ISA would be to involve as many nations as
possible in the exploration and exploitation of space. When considered in
conjunction with the principle that space is the province of all mankind, it
becomes obvious that nations should be given a presumption of fitness for
membership. However, a critical consideration of membership would be the
dual-use potential of the nation's technologies. Nations which have exhibited a
predisposition to exercising military uses of such technology 56 should be
susceptible to a more rigorous standard for admission.
Thus, a method must be developed to allow membership in the ISA subject
only to the qualification that a nation use the technologies solely for peaceful
purposes. Subsequent to the fitness presumption, a Security Review Committee
should examine each nation's request for admission so as to exclude those
nations considered a threat to international peace if they were in possession of
such data and technology. Because this committee's purpose would be to
maintain control over the technologies so they are used only for peaceful
purposes, a mission similar to that of the U.N. Security Council, the logical
choice for the members of this committee would be representatives from the
permanent members of the Security Council.57
However, the procedure for membership review by the committee would
have to be decidedly different from the procedure of the Security Council.

54. See supra part IV.
55. These fundamental principles of international law, necessary for the operation of an ISA, are included
in the primary space law agreements. However, they are significant enough to bear specific inclusion.
56. Iraq's use of its nuclear power technology in an attempt to develop nuclear weapons is an example.
57. The permanent members of the Security Council are the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, and China. U.N. CHARTER, art. 23. Coincidentally, these same five nations are among the world
leaders in space technology and would be among the major financial contributors to the ISA, lending additional
support to their selection for membership in the review committee.
There is likely to be little opposition to the membership of these nations in the ISA and they are likely
to seek to become members. Thus, this committee could perform its function even with regard to those nations
seeking to become the initial members of the ISA.
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Security Council action can be vetoed by any one of the permanent members of
the Security Council. 8 The Review Committee should prohibit admission only
by a unanimous vote. Exclusion should be the exception rather than the rule.
3. The Governing Council
The representative body of the ISA should provide the primary means by
which the member nations would maintain control over their financial and
technological investment in the ISA. It would also serve as the forum through
which the members conduct the business of reaching the goals of the ISA. This
representative body would be the Governing Council. Among the issues to be
considered in devising the Council provision are member nation representation,
the scope of control, and the voting methodology.
Council representation and procedure would present relatively minor issues.
Representation on the Council of each member would be most easily facilitated
by providing that each member nation appoint one person to act as the official
representative of that member's interests. Appointment or election of the
representative would be left to the individual member nation. This representative
would speak and vote on behalf of the member nation in Council proceedings.
Each representative would be permitted assistance by a staff as needed to
adequately perform his duties. Council procedure could be adopted from59
virtually any international organization, such as the U.N. General Assembly
or the Council of the European Space Agency. 6°
The Council, as the primary governing body of the ISA, would have control
over a broad range of matters. The Council would elect the task group
committees and direct the distribution of work to such groups.6' One of the
Council's most significant duties would be to conduct the final approval stage
of the budgetary process. 62 The Council would also elect the Agency Director,63 the Technical Director,64 and the judges on the dispute resolution
panel. 65 The Council would have the final approval of agency procurement'
and approval of sales of information to non-members.67 The Council, in its

58. Id. art. 27.
59. See U.N. CHARTER, ch. IV.
60. See ESA Treaty, supra note 22, art. XI.
61. These task groups would be charged with the daily operation of the ISA. See infra part V.B.5.
62. See infra part V.B.6.
63. See infra part V.B.4.
64. Id.
65. See infra part V.B.14.
66. The ISA would have to procure products or services from private individuals or firms. The Council
should distribute the economic benefits among member nations in accordance with their relative financial
contributions. Purchases from non-members should be allowed, but preference should be given to members
as an economic benefit of membership.
To ensure that member nations are treated fairly, the Council should establish an Auditing Committee to
examine the distribution of economic investment. At the request of a member, an audit [assuming such audit
indicates that member's derived economic benefits to be less than that nation's equitable share] should be prima
facie evidence in a claim by that member against the agency before the agency dispute resolution panel.
67. See infra part V.B.8-9.
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agency oversight rule, would also establish and administer auditing committees
for supervising both the financial and technical matters of the agency. The worst
case example of the Council's duties would be dissolution of the agency.68 The
Council's main duty would be to provide a forum for members to propose
agency actions and to approve such actions at the "project level."
Council sanction should be required for all agency actions at the project
level. Thus, the key question would be, what should be the definition of a
"project"? Should a project be a broad goal, such as the development of a heavy
lift launch vehicle [HLLV], or something more narrow, such as the development
of materials for an HLLV's skin? Defining "project" narrowly would force the
Council to be involved in the approval of minuscule details which would limit
efficiency. However, defining "project" too broadly would relieve the Council
of much of its power, which would be the primary method through which the
member states would retain control over their participation. Thus, "project"
should be defined as a major expenditure of funds and expertise for the
accomplishment of a significant goal. A significant goal should not include the
development of materials, propulsion systems, control and data management
systems, or similar component systems. However, an agency action which
would be the result of a sum total of these component developments would be
a significant goal. Thus, a program for the remote sensing of third world
countries, including the launching of a new remote sensing satellite, would be
a significant goal, and therefore designated a "project" requiring Council
approval. Development of a new type of imaging for remote sensing use would
not be a significant goal.
Perhaps the most difficult issue in the structuring of the Council would be
the voting methodology. This provision would require the most significant
balancing of the interests of the space powers and the NSFNs. This issue would
have two facets: 1) the distribution of voting power among the members, and 2)
the majority requirements for given issues.
The distribution of voting power could proceed along one of two traditional
routes. The first possibility would be a voting scheme of one vote per member
nation. 69 This option would provide for the greatest amount of input from the
NSFNs, but consequently, would subject the space powers, who would bear the
majority of both the financial and technical burdens of the ISA, to the whims of
the NSFNs. The second option would allocate voting power based on each
member's respective financial contribution.70 However, while this possibility
would maximize control by the space powers over their significant investment,
it would also minimize the interests of the NSFNs. Neither of these options
alone presents a satisfactory solution.
A voting system which would be a hybrid of the above two systems could
yield an acceptable methodology. This method would involve conducting two
simultaneous votes. Each member would vote for or against an issue. The votes

68. See infra part V.B.12. Accession would be subject to the membership review committee. Id.
69. ESA Treaty, supra note 22, art. XI.
70. See infra part V.B.6.
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would then be tabulated in two separate ways. First, votes would be counted on
a one ballot per member basis. The tally would then be compared to the given
majority requirement for that issue. If the ballot total failed this first test, the
proposal would be defeated. Second, votes would be counted on the basis of
financial contribution. Again the tally would be required to pass a certain
percentage of financial control. If the vote passed this second test, the proposal
would be approved.7
Having devised a voting methodology, the issue becomes what threshold
levels of ballots and financial backing should be required for project approval.
For most issues, such as agency internal affairs, third party dissemination, and
project approval, a simple majority on both counts would be sufficient. For
some issues with particular significance, such as budget approval and dissolution,
super-majorities of two-thirds or three-fourths should be required.
4. Agency Director and Technical Director
The Agency Director would be the figurehead of the agency. Within the
agency, the Director would conduct meetings of the Council, present the budget
proposal,72 and serve as a guiding force in the direction of the agency with
regard to its programs and goals.73 The Director would also be the principal
extra-agency figure when acting as its legal representative. The Director would
conduct the ISA's relations with foreign governments and with private
individuals. Chief among the Director's duties would be contractual dealings on
behalf of the agency, including both procurement contracts and sales of
information to non-members.
In order to fulfill his mission as overall agency figurehead and due to his
vast influence in directing the ISA's programs, the Director must: 1) be accepted
by a substantial majority of the agency members, and 2) be vested with a large
degree of independence from his nation. The simplest way to meet the first
criterion would be to elect the Director from nominations by the Council
representatives by a two-thirds majority. By giving the Director a term in office
of five years, subject only to removal by a two-thirds majority of the Council,
the agency would be given some continuity of direction over time. The logical
way to meet the second criterion would be to provide that upon election, the
Director may not be responsible to his national government.

71. The criticism of this method is that combining two voting requirements which have antithetical aims,
neither of which is sufficient standing alone, cannot possibly yield anything but gridlock within the Council
decision process. The response to this criticism is that one must not overlook the inevitable politics of an
organization such as the ISA. For example, an NSFN whose proposal carries sufficient pro rata ballots but
does not meet the financial contribution requirement, could make a voting agreement with a space power, who
has a proposal that carries sufficient financial votes but an insufficient number of pro rata ballots and vice
versa. Thus, the politics of the ISA would force both the space powers and the NSFNs to reach mutually
acceptable decisions through cooperation and concession.
72. See infra part V.B.6.
73. These goals establish the next "leap" in technology to be taken. These "leaps" trickle down to the
average person and generate the ultimate value of the space program. One way to reach the average person
would be to require the Director to give a yearly state-of-the-agency address.
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The second principal officer of the ISA would be a Technical Director. The
Technical Director's purpose would be to coordinate the various agency task
groups. Coordination would be extremely important given the interrelation
required among the various committees in conducting major projects.74
Because the Technical Director would perform only a coordinating function, the
concerns regarding the leadership nature of the Agency Director's position would
not apply. Therefore, election of the Technical Director from the Council
members by a simple majority, for a one year term, would be sufficient.75
Again, the Technical Director should be chosen from among nominees submitted
by the Council representatives.
5. Scientific, Technical, and Legal Programs
To better organize the efforts of the ISA, a division of labor into specialized
departments would be required. These departments should, on one hand, consist
of the continuing developmental areas of space activity including a Launch
Services Group,7 6 a Satellite Services Group,77 an Astronomy and Interstellar
Research Group, 78 a Space Resource Exploitation Group,7 9 and an Earth
Missions Group."0 In addition, specialized divisions should be established with
regard to each of the "banner projects," including the space station, the aerospace
plane, the mission to Mars, and the return to and exploitation of the moon, in
both their developmental and operational phases. Groups may be added or
terminated in order to meet the needs of the ISA.
Organization of the ISA in this manner would create greater efficiency in
the organization. It is, however, a departure from the precedent set by the
European Space Agency (ESA). The ESA is organized on a project by project
Some projects are mandatory and are included in the mandatory
basis.8
funding scheme of the ESA. 2 Other ESA projects, however, are voluntary with

74. See infra part V.B.5.
75. Removal would likely not be important with regard to the Technical Director's position. However,
to give the office stability, removal should be only by a super-majority vote of the Council.
76. The Launch Services Group would be responsible not only for conducting launchings and mission
support for the ISA, both in an agency role and in a commercial role, but also for development of new launch
technologies.
77. The Satellite Services Group would be responsible for construction of satellites for all phases of the
ISA missions including space probes, meteorological satellites, telecommunications satellites, and remote
sensing satellites.
78. The Astronomy and Interstellar Research Group would be responsible for the formulation and conduct
of studies in the areas of astronomy and interstellar research. Among the duties of this group would be
research using radio and optical telescopes and monitoring and interpretation of data from interstellar probes.
79. The Exploitation Group would be responsible for areas such as development and utilization of solar
power, development of extraterrestrial mineral procurement, exploitation of geostationary orbits, and the use
of space as a method of waste disposal.
80. The Earth Missions Group would be responsible for all space missions conducted in near-earth orbits.
Among these would be remote sensing, global communications, and meteorological monitoring.
81. ESA Treaty, supra note 22, art. V.
82. Id. arts. V, XIII.
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project funding required only from members who opt to participate.83 In the
interests of encouraging nations to join the ISA and of providing the benefits of
space technology to the entire world, the ISA should make all of its projects
mandatory."
Mandatory participation would lend strong support to the
principle of balancing the interests of the space powers and the NSFNs.
Two additional specialized divisions should be formed: an Environmental
Monitoring Group [EMG] 85 and a Legal Development Committee. The EMG
should not have a veto over the programs of the other specialized committees,
but rather would serve to keep the environmental aspects of the ISA under
consideration. The task of balancing the environmental considerations against
the benefits of the proposed program should be left to the individual task
committees, who would make the ultimate decision whether to proceed with a
given project. The Legal Development Committee would be charged with
expanding the legal guidelines of space activities. These guidelines would
include not only broad principles of space law, but also the regulations
applicable within the agency. The legal committee would not legislate such
guidelines, but would study the issues and develop drafts of such guidelines to
be submitted to the Council for adoption.86
The division of labor calls for two additional considerations. First,
inevitably some projects would fall within the purview of multiple groups 7 .
This overlapping would require coordination between task groups for the
successful completion of the project. This coordinative function should be
performed by the Technical Director.8 Second, the function of each group
would be to carry out projects within its scope. Thus, each group would be
charged with the daily administration of the agency's projects. Each group,
however, should be allowed to formulate concepts and submit them to the

83. Id.
84. An additional reason to make all ISA projects mandatory would be the ISA's goal of disseminating
not only information and results from space research, but also of distributing the technologies used. Members
opting to participate in only some of the ISA's projects could receive substantial benefits from programs in
which they chose not to participate. This would be a result of the nature of the ISA. Technology developed
for one agency project is likely to cross over to other agency projects.
85. The Environmental Monitoring Group should not be confused with the remote sensing functions of
the Earth Missions Group. Rather, the Environmental Group would monitor the environmental effects of the
actions of the ISA. Among its concerns would be the effects of launchings on the earth's atmosphere, the
effects of the use of nuclear power on board space objects, and the disposal of wastes generated on earth and
in space. Each of these areas presents a plethora of complicated issues which are beyond the scope of this
paper, but include problems of launch malfunction and the uncertainty regarding environmental effects on space
and the stellar bodies. As the exploitation and utilization of space continues to expand, further issues may arise
as to man's responsibility to protect the pristine state of extra-terrestrial environments. As an example,
mankind should consider whether a rocket powered probe of Saturn's moon Titan would disrupt its unique
atmosphere. See WILLIAM J. KAUFMANN, IH, UNIVERSE 292-94 (2d ed. 1988).
86. See infra part V.B.3.
87. As an example, the development, deployment, and operation of a new geostationary communications
satellite would require efforts from the Satellite Services Group, the Launch Services Group, the Earth Missions
Group, and the Space Resource Exploitation Group.
88. See supra part V.B.4.
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Council for approval." But, they should only be allowed to carry out Council
approved projects.
The groups must take care that they do not exceed their authority and do
not intrude within the domain of the Council. To facilitate this, any member
nation should be permitted to request from the agency judicial panel90 a ruling
regarding whether a decision must be submitted to the Council for approval.
The decision of the judicial panel should be binding and final.
Finally, the question arises as to the composition of the committees
administering9 1 each of the groups. Each committee should be representative
of the overriding goals of the ISA and thus recognize the interests of both the
space powers and the NSFNs. A five-member committee would satisfy this goal
by requiring two members to be from NSFNs, one member from the Security
Review Committee,92 one additional space power member, and a fifth at-large
member.9 3 Voting on matters within the group's control should be carried out
strictly on a majority basis with each committee member having one vote. This
voting mechanism would equalize the NSFN's voting power with that of the
space powers at the implementation level and would serve to counterbalance in
part the financially-based weighted voting process of the Council.
6. Agency Funding
The funding scheme of the ISA must reflect the ability of each member
nation to contribute financially in order to further the goal of increasing the
participation of NSFNs in space. Thus, establishing a percentage contribution
schedule based on the annual gross domestic product94 of each participating
nation ensures a fair allocation of the costs of the ISA.95 This method of cost
allocation also reflects the fact that the developed nations, which would bear the
majority of the agency's financial burden, stand the most to gain from the space
program because the space powers would have the most diverse economies to
which the technologies and results could be applied.
The accompanying table illustrates a potential contribution schedule. The
1994 NASA budget is approximately $15 billion.96 Consider an ISA budget

89. It would be critical for the groups to provide feedback to the Council since the task groups would be
intimately associated with the actual work of the ISA.
90. See infra part V.B.14.
91. The committees discussed in this section are merely the top level management personnel for each task
group. It is contemplated that the agency would maintain a permanent staff which would comprise the
agency's employees. These employees would, like those of any other "corporation," be hired and retained
based on their abilities to fulfill the needs of the agency.
92. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. See supra part V.B.2.
93. A committee member need not be a given nation's Council representative but could be a member of
the representative's staff.
94. In determining the gross domestic product, the average gross domestic product over the previous three
years should be used to obtain an accurate measure of a member's GDP and to take into consideration
economic fluctuations. This would be particularly important in the case of NSFNs.
95. This is the same type of funding scheme employed by the ESA. ESA Treaty, supra note 22, art. XIII.
96. See Asker, supra note 3, at 25.
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ISA FINANCIAL CONTRIUTIONS 97
GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT ($BILLIONS)

NATION

PERCENTAGE (%) OF
TOTAL ISA NATIONAL
PRODUCT

THE SPACE POWERS

5600

30.25

United Kingdom

915

4.94

France

1000

5.40

Russia

2500

13.50

China

393

2.12

Italy

965

5.21

Canada

521

2.81

Japan

2300

12.42

Germany

1331

7.19

United States

THE NON-SPACE-FARING NATIONS [NSFNs]
Australia

311

1.68

Austria

164

0.89

Brazil

388

2.10

Senegal

5

0.03

Ecuador

12

0.06

Israel

55

0.30

7

0.04

48

0.26

2000

10.80

18,515

100%

Sri Lanka
Ukraine
All other NSFNs
TOTAL

97. See generally ROBERT FARNIGHETI, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1994 (1993).
Note that the difference in percentage contribution between China and Brazil would be only 0.02%. The
reason for classifying China as a space power, but Brazil as an NSFN, would be the fact that China has a more
technologically advanced space program. MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 196-99.
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250% as large, a total of $37.5 billion; under the schedule, the United States
contribution would be $11.3 billion. In effect this would be a savings to the
United States of $3.7 billion. This is an outstanding example of the principal
economic benefit of forming the ISA.
The second dimension of the financial question woulid deal with setting the
total agency funding goal. Again, a balancing of the interests of the space
powers and the NSFNs must be performed. The space powers, who would bear
most of the financial burden of the ISA, would be resistant to having the total
funding goal subject to the pro rata vote of the entire ISA membership in a
Council setting, where most representatives would be from NSFNs. On the other
hand, allowing the space powers to control the total goal might cause them to
hold down the total budget and thus, their individual contributions. This
conservative action could undermine the confidence of both the NSFNs and the
space powers in the ISA concept of broad multilateral participation.9 8
This dilemma can be resolved by splitting the funding process into two
stages. The first stage would be the budget proposal process. In this phase each
member nation would submit a budget proposal to the Agency Director. The
Director would then synthesize an agency budget proposal, taking into account
each member's proposal, and submit the final proposal to the Council for
approval.
At the Council approval stage, voting should be modified to reflect the
interests of mankind in an aggressive space program. In spite of the likely
objection of the space powers, in order to maintain the spirit of equality of
nations, voting should be conducted on a one vote per nation basis and require
a super-majority of the vote for approval. However, to reflect the interests of the
space powers in maintaining a greater degree of control over the budget, at least
six of the nine space powers should be required for approval of the budget, in
addition to receiving affirmative votes from nations contributing at least twothirds of the total budget. In the event that a budget proposal is rejected, the
member nations should submit revised budget proposals to the Director with the
synthesis and the voting process should be repeated.
Approval of the budget by the agency does not end the necessity for agency
control over the budget. Just as important as budget approval by the agency
would be member governments' domestic appropriations to the ISA, consistent
with the agency budget. The simple way to avoid any potential difficulties at the
domestic level is to require, under the ISA Treaty, that member nations enact
domestic legislation necessary for them to meet their financial obligations under
the treaty.
One final funding point must be made with regard to the form of a
member's contribution. The usual case would be for members to make their
contributions in a monetary form. However, particularly in the initial formation

98. Undermining the confidence in international participation could be one of the greatest potential
undoings of the ISA. Unless a belief could be maintained that cooperation is the most beneficial method of
conducting space activities, NSFNs may see it to be in their best interests to continue conducting space activity
by contract with individual space powers, and the space powers may see it to be iii their best interests to pursue
space objectives under individual programs.
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of the agency, provisions should be made for contributions to the agency in the
form of property, including real property, laboratory and tracking facilities,
equipment, and in other non-monetary forms. Property contributions should be
discounted against a member's financial obligation at the property's fair market
value. In order for the property contribution to be valid, legal title should be
transferred to the ISA.9 Transfer of title to the agency would eliminate any
problem of a member nation placing its programs ahead of those of the agency
and would give the agency priority in use of the property."
In spite of a provision requiring domestic implementation of each member's
obligations, there is no doubt that situations would arise where member states
would fail to meet their contribution requirements. In such a case, the agency
must turn to dispute resolution under the treaty.' 0
7. Ownership and Use of Facilities and Systems
The ISA would have facilities scattered among a number of countries. This
could lead to several potential controversial situations which could for the most
part be eliminated by establishing a uniform system of ownership and priorities
in use.
The ISA could acquire facilities and systems in a number of ways.
Members could make their financial contributions in the form of facilities and
systems. The ISA Treaty should also provide for the purchase of properties from
members at their fair market value. 0 2 The ISA should not, however, be
prevented from renting facilities and services where the agency cannot acquire
title in the properties. Such rentals should be made for a reasonable fee from
member nations where possible' 3 and feasible."°4 In any case, other than
rental of property and systems by the agency, title in the property should be
vested in the agency.
The agency should not be prevented from leasing its properties for a
reasonable fee for use by agency members, as long as there would be no conflict
with the ISA's agenda. A more difficult question would arise regarding whether
the agency should rent its properties to non-member nations. Allowing rentals
to non-members would decrease the incentive for nations to join the ISA.

99. The consideration given by the ISA in exchange for the property would be the return of information
to the member from the agency's projects. See infra part V.B.8-9.
100. Allowing a member government to place its agenda ahead of that of the agency in effect would also
put the interests of all other members in a subordinate position. Clearly, this could lead to a great deal of
conflict within the agency. Minimizing conflict among member states would be crucial to the success of such
a broad multilateral organization.
101. See infra part V.B.14.
102. Purchase from non-members should also be permitted, but where possible, preference should be given
to facilities within member nations in the interest of providing an economic return to the ISA members.
103. Rental from non-members, where necessary, should be permitted, but priority should be given to
member nations in the interest of providing economic return to the ISA members.
104. "Feasible" would include a balancing of several factors including whether the property would be used
on multiple occasions, whether the cost is prohibitive, and the significance of the agency having priority in the
use of the property.
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However, denying rentals to non-members would be to ignore the scientific,
cooperative, and worldwide goals of the agency. Thus, rentals should be allowed
to non-members, but for a price reasonably in excess of the amount a member
would be charged.'0 5
Furthermore, the ISA should be permitted to generate income by engaging
in commercial space activities with private firms and individuals. Among the
potential forms of commercial activity would be the launching of objects into
space, the sales of remote sensing data, and the sale of agency satellite utilization
shares. °06 Commercial activities with firms operating in non-member nations
would not present the same problems as rental to non-member governments."
Thus, the agency should be permitted to rent to any private individual or firm
unless an issue exists regarding national or global security.
8. Rights to Information from Agency Projects
A substantial issue would arise as to the dissemination of information and
the results from agency projects. A member would make its funding contribution in exchange for which the agency would disseminate to the member the
information resulting from agency actions. Thus, members should not be
charged an additional amount for acquiring such information. Should such
information also be available to nations who are not ISA members? Consistent
with the goal of opening space to the entire world, the obvious answer would be
that, as a general rule, non-members should be able to acquire such information.
However, access to information should be at a discount to agency members.
Thus, in selling information to non-member governments, the agency should
charge a fee in excess of the amount contributed by member nations.'
9. Intellectual Property Rights
The ownership of the intellectual property generated by the agency would
present one of the more delicate issues facing the ISA. [The distinction being
made here is between the data and results from ISA projects and the technologies
used to obtain such data and results.] While the data and results generated by
the agency could have an adverse effect on international peace, a far greater
danger would exist with regard to the systems used to carry out space related
activities. Thus, while the agency should act to disseminate data and results as
widely as possible, the intellectual property should be more closely held.

105. This would place a premium on agency membership without ignoring the fundamental purpose of the
ISA.
106. An example of sales of satellite utilization shares would be a case where the agency operates a
maritime communications satellite and allows its use by an international shipping company.
107. Failure by the agency to rent to private individuals and firms in non-member nations would have only
a secondary and minimal effect on discouraging the non-member from joining the ISA.
108. This would encourage nations to join the ISA since the information could be obtained through a
membership contribution in a proportionately smaller amount, and a membership contribution would also be
in exchange for a significant amount of other information.
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The question of who or what entity should own the intellectual property
rights of the agency must also be resolved. Should the rights vest in the person
who was the key in the development of the property, or perhaps, the member
nation which is home to such individual? The most logical answer of course
would be to vest the intellectual property rights in the agency. Since every
member of the agency would be contributing financially to the development of
the technology, title should be vested in all of the members collectively. Giving
the property rights to the agency would also make security of the property an
easier task.
Property contributed by a member nation as part of its financial contribution
would present a different issue. The member nation which developed the
property should rightfully retain the intellectual property rights. As a condition
of its contribution, however, the agency should receive a perpetual license to use
the property.' 9 The amount paid by the agency for the right to use such
property should be the fair market value of the technology involved." 0
Another facet of the intellectual property issue would revolve around those
nations which would desire to obtain use of the rights held by the agency. The
agency's purpose would be to distribute data and technologies which can be used
in a non-military manner."' Thus, some of the technologies must be distributed to the member nations subject to security restrictions." 2 Such technologies
would represent a portion of the return on a nation's financial contribution. As
such, no additional financial charge should be required for a member's
acquisition of such technology.
The sale of such technologies to non-members would present another
opportunity to generate income for the agency. Again, subject to security
restrictions, these technologies should be available for sale to non-members. The
charge to non-members for acquiring such technology should be a reasonable
amount, but should also exceed the amount that nation would have contributed
to the development project had that nation been a member of the ISA. This
greater charge would place a premium on ISA membership and would encourage
the non-member to join the ISA.
10. Protection of International Security
Space research, perhaps more than any other area of science, has the
potential both to be used in weapons of a devastating caliber and to provide

109. This perpetual license would prevent any problems in using the technology in the event the
contributing nation should leave the ISA. Without such a license, a nation leaving the ISA could withhold the
rights to use the technology from the agency, thus hampering continuing agency programs.
110. Charging the agency the cost of development of the property would be inequitable because the
developing nation would have produced the property for its own benefit, rather than for the benefit of the
agency.
111. These non-military technologies, particularly the derivative technologies suitable for everyday use by
the average person, represent perhaps the greatest benefit from an aggressive space program.
112. See infra part V.B.10.
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critical military intelligence.1 ' Among the potential types of information
which could be implicated in security restrictions are remote sensing data"4
and rocket technology." 5 Thus, the ISA must have some procedure for
restricting the flow of information, both in the form of project results and
technology, which could have an adverse effect on international peace. At the
initial level, this restriction would be accomplished by the screening of potential
members by the Security Review Committee. However, as the work of the
agency progresses, information could arise which would be critical in certain
situations that could lead to a threat to the peace. In such a case, a method must
exist for restricting the flow of information from the ISA to the member
governments.
The best way to meet this restricting function would be for the Security
Review Committee to screen the dissemination of data and technology. As
stated earlier, the Security Review Committee should be composed of representatives from the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Because the
committee's purpose would be to review the fitness of the information for
dissemination, the committee members must have access to the information. By
utilizing the U.N. Security Council members, the Review Committee would
consist of nations which would already be in possession of the information
through domestic sources. For this same reason, any action by the committee
of withholding information should be non-reviewable.
The procedure for committee review of information should be the same as
it would be for the membership process. All data and results should be
presumed fit for dissemination to all members, but should also allow for rebuttal
of the presumption. Great care must be taken not to restrict the flow of
information unnecessarily. It must be kept in mind that a primary purpose of the
ISA would be to facilitate the flow of information for the betterment of all
mankind. Thus, in the interest of efficiency, information should be reviewed
only when at least two members of the Review Committee propose such
screening." 6 Data and results should be withheld only with such a vote by at
least four of the five committee members." 7
The dissemination of the agency's intellectual property should be more
broadly restricted. The technologies must be supplied to the ISA members to the
extent necessary for a given member to meet their agency obligations.
Additional technologies must also be distributed to the ISA members, because

113. For an example of how the U.S. restricts potential military technologies through the Military Critical
Technologies List, see generally FINKLER ET AL., supra note 50.
anU
d Ti-tw
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114. Remote sensing data can be Used 1c, rmal %te Zlcatii
115. Rocket technology would be particularly dangerous since it could be used as a delivery system for
a variety of weapons including chemical and nuclear devices.
116. Requiring two nations to propose review would eliminate the inefficiency that could result from a
single overly sensitive nation making constant objectives, thus frustrating the purposes of the ISA.
117. In the membership scenario, in the interest of opening space to the entire world, membership would
be denied only by a unanimous vote. By requiring only four committee members to vote for withholding
information, the committee could restrict information from a given project which the majority feels would be
damaging to international peace, but such restriction would not affect the restricted nation's access to
information resulting from other ISA projects.
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the acquisition of spin-off technologies would present one of the primary reasons
for nations to participate in the ISA. Thus, when at least two of the members
of the Review Committee vote to withhold technology, such information should
be restricted.1 8 This balancing recognizes that some technologies, such as that
in communications satellites, presents significantly less danger to international
peace than other technologies, such as advanced rocketry.
11. Non-member Cooperation
A major issue would arise regarding whether non-members should be
permitted to participate significantly in agency projects without joining the
agency. Many of the same considerations applicable to the sale of project results
to non-members would apply to participation by non-members. In the interest
of opening space to all nations, cooperation with non-members should be
allowed, but a financial premium should be retained for ISA members. Results,
information, and intellectual property rights distributed in such cooperative
efforts should be limited to the scope of participation and be subject to an
appropriate financial contribution from the non-member. Cooperating nonmembers should be permitted access to facilities and systems consistent with the
cooperative program. Additionally, in furtherance of cooperative programs, the
ISA should be permitted to offer and to receive both information and personnel
with respect to the joint program.
12. Accession, Withdrawal, and Dissolution
The ISA would no doubt undergo changes in its membership, or it could
even cease to exist. These contingencies should be dealt with in the ISA Treaty.
As the ISA begins to fulfill its purposes and begins to meet its goal of
opening space to the entire world, other nations would likely seek to accede to
the agency. As mentioned earlier, any nation seeking to join the ISA should be
presumed fit for membership subject to review by the Security Review
Committee." 9 A nation could begin the process of accession by appealing to
the Director to be considered for membership. The Director would then present
the request to the Security Review Committee for approval.' 20 The candidate
would become a member at the beginning of the next agency financial year, at
which point the new member would be incorporated into the funding process and
would be given their seat on the Council. One final condition should be placed

118. Requiring two members to vote to withhold the intellectual property from dissemination would prevent
arbitrary withholding. However, the two member vote would also place emphasis on withholding potentially
dangerous intellectual properties in the interest of international peace.
119. See supra part V.B.2.
120. In the interest of meeting the goal of opening up space to all nations, the Council should not be
required to approve the accession of any candidate. The Security Review Committee should have the sole right
to reject the request for membership. Conditioning accession on an affirmative vote by the Council would
merely reinject the political positions of the members and the candidate into the operation of the agency,
frustrating the goal of making space the province of all mankind.
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on accession. Because any acceding member would be benefitting from the
previous work of the agency and the previous financial contributions of its
members, the acceding member should also be required to contribute an initial
sum equal to the total which the nation would have contributed the previous
three years had they been a member.'2 '
Withdrawal from the agency would present few difficult issues. When a
nation chooses to end its membership in the ISA, it should be required to give
notice to that effect at least one year prior to the effective date. 2 2 In that
interim period, the member should be required to continue fulfilling its ISA
obligations. The agency should pay in full any amount owed to the withdrawing
member as of the effective date of termination. The issues of primary concern
would be the member's right to retain information and technology obtained from
agency participation and the disposition of agency facilities within the
withdrawing member's jurisdiction. Recovery of information and technology
would be next to impossible. Imposition of a termination fee would be
unreasonable given that the member's financial contributions were in exchange
for such information and technology."2 3 Thus, withdrawing members should
not be charged an additional fee to retain and use information and technology
acquired as an agency member. The resolution of the property issue would be
equally straightforward. If the withdrawing government had no objections to the
agency remaining within its jurisdiction, the agency should be allowed to
continue to own or to rent the properties in question. If the withdrawing
member would prefer the agency to leave its jurisdiction, the member should be
compelled by the ISA Treaty to purchase all agency property at its fair market
value.24
Dissolution would involve many of the same issues as withdrawal.
Dissolution should be conditioned on a super-majority vote of the Council based
on a pro rata tally and on a financial contribution basis. The dissolution should
go into effect at the end of the first fiscal year following the vote. The first step
the agency should take would be to distribute all information and technology to
all members. t 5 The agency should then settle all debts with its member
nations and the agency properties within each member nation should be turned

121. If the ISA has existed less than three years, the candidate's initial contribution should equal what their
contribution would have been over the previous years of the agency's existence. Also, acceding members
should be permitted to make both their initial and yearly contributions in the form of property.

122. The implications of withdrawal would require a significant amount of time to wintd up the member's
agency affairs including disposition of property, conclusion of projects in progress, and collection of
outstanding debts.
123. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that a former member seeking to rejoin the ISA would be
subject to the initial accession contribution required of all acceding members. In the event that a former
member would rejoin the ISA, its initial accession fee should not exceed its financial contributions due had it
remained a member without interruption. See supra text accompanying note 120.
124. This would include having the member buy out the remaining terms on any leases held by the agency.
125. Such dissemination should, of course, be subject to the approval of the Security Review Committee.
See supra part V.B.10.
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over to the members. 2 6 Finally, the remaining agency funds should be
distributed among the member nations in accordance with the most recent
financial contribution percentages.
13. Privileges and Immunities
As with all international organizations, the privileges and immunities of the
agency within each member nation must be clearly defined within the ISA
Treaty. t27 The privileges and immunities may be divided into two types: those
of the agency as an entity and those of the agency's personnel. The privileges
and immunities should facilitate the operation of the agency. Thus, the agency
should cooperate at all times with domestic authorities in complying with police
and safety regulations, health and labor regulations, and in the prevention of
abuses of the privileges and immunities.
The agency privileges and immunities would deal with considerations of the
agency as a whole. Principal among the privileges would be the right of the
agency and its personnel and equipment to travel between the various member
nations without paying customs and duties. A second major privilege would be
the exception of the agency from paying taxes at the agency level. 128 Among
the immunities of the agency should be the inviolability of the agency's facilities
and records. The property of the organization should be immune from
expropriation. Furthermore, national member governments should not be

126. This may seem a bit inequitable given that a nation with a great deal of agency property within its
jurisdiction would stand to gain a great deal more than members which have little or no agency property within
their jurisdiction. However, nations where significant agency property is located would have most likely
expended significant domestic funds to support those facilities, such as roadway maintenance, fire and police
protection, and communications and power service maintenance. In light of these additional domestic
expenditures, the inequity would not be as pronounced.
An alternative distribution method would require distribution of property to those nations where the
property is located, coupled with financial compensation to nations receiving less than their equitable share.
In order to balance the financial return to the members upon dissolution, total distributions should be in
accordance with the latest financial contribution percentages. This would require nations, receiving property
in excess of their contribution share, to be compelled to "purchase" the excess value. The total financial
balance of the agency would then be distributed to those members who receive no property or property of less
value than that called for by their contribution share.
127. See generally Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Space Research Organization,
Oct. 31, 1963, 805 U.N.T.S. 279; ESA Treaty, supra note 22.
128. Requiring the agency to pay taxes on the amount contributed by the members would in effect be a
requirement that the agency pay taxes on money the members raised by domestic taxes in the first place. Also,
requiring the agency to pay taxes on the contributions by other members would allow one member to profit
from those contributions, a potential violation of state sovereignty. The most significant problem, of course,
would be the likelihood of multiple taxation. A domestic requirement that agency personnel pay taxes on their
salary and possessions should also not be allowed due to the different tax structures of the various nations
where agency facilities would be located.
Note that the agreement should only prohibit taxation on the contributions of the members. Agency
income generated by sales of information or technology within a national jurisdiction should be taxable. (In
respect to sales, the agency would be functioning like any other business and thus, should be subject to
taxation.) This of course would mean that a nation could entice the agency to locate facilities within its
jurisdiction by providing tax incentives.
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allowed to restrict the flow of information to or from the agency and its
members.
The personnel privileges and immunities should be those generally accorded
to diplomatic personnel. The personal immunities should include, for example,
immunity from arrest and detention, immunity from jurisdiction arising from
agency acts, inviolability of official papers and documents, importation and
exportation of belongings for personnel use in a duty free manner, and other
immunities necessary to facilitate complete independence in the exercise of
agency functions. These immunities should not be absolute, however. Member
states should be required to waive the immunities where such waiver would be
necessary for the execution of justice and where the waiver would not defeat the
purpose for which the immunities were given.
14. Dispute Resolution
As with any international agreement, particular attention must be paid to the
dispute resolution provisions of the ISA Treaty. In the case of the ISA, disputes
could occur between member nations, between the agency and a member,
between the agency and a non-member, or between a member and a non-member
arising from an agency action. Since the ISA would lead to persons of many
nations interacting together, the dispute resolution provision should also be
applicable to disputes involving nationals of agency members arising from
agency activity.'29 Each of these possible combinations would involve
potentially different methodologies.
Dispersion of liability for damage resulting from actions conducted by the
agency would present one of the major reasons for joining the ISA. At the
outset it should be kept in mind that conducting space activities is very
hazardous. The potential damage from the agency's programs would include
property damage from errant launchings and nuclear contamination. t30 Thus,
when damage results from actions conducted by the ISA, the liability should be
charged to the agency rather than to the member nations involved.' 3t Agency
members should not be precluded from bringing actions against the agency for
damages resulting from agency actions. Finally, the dispersion of liability would
occur at the funding level where the budget process could take into account any

129. This would provide a single system of law applicable to all agency individuals rather than leaving the
form of private law open to question. However, note that the agency dispute resolution panel should only have
jurisdiction arising from activities arising from agency action. As an example, a tort committed by an
individual on another, both of whom are associated with the agency, during an agency project (ie. on an agency
space station), would be subject to the panel's jurisdiction. However, where an individual associated with the
agency commits a tort against a person not associated with the agency, the dispute should be left to domestic
legal procedures.
130. There have been numerous instances of launches which have caused terrestrial damage, including a
June 1969 incident where a Japanese cargo ship was damaged and several sailors injured. Pfeifer, supra note
36, at 215-16. See also supra note 19.

131. This should not be the case where the damage resulted from the actions taken by one member and
where such action was not in pursuance of an ISA program.
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liabilities incurred by the agency with the corresponding apportionment among
agency members.
The first stage in the resolution of any dispute arising from ISA activities
should, of course, be negotiation between the parties. Mediation or conciliation
should also be attempted where feasible.
When these methods fail to resolve disputes between the agency and a
member or between two members, the situation should be referred to the
agency's dispute resolution panel. The panel should be given jurisdiction under
the ISA treaty of all disputes arising from agency matters.' 3 2 The awards made
by the panel could include monetary damages, injunctive relief backed by other
remedies, and suspension of privileges.' 33
The panel membership should reflect the interests of the space powers and
the NSFNs. This balancing could be accomplished by having seven members
on the panel consisting of three space power representatives, three NSFN
representatives, and one at-large member. The space powers and the NSFNs,
both collectively, should each prepare a list of prospective panel members with
each member nominating one person to their respective list. The space powers
would then elect their representatives from their list on a majority basis with
each nation having one vote, and the NSFNs would do likewise with respect to
their nominees. The at-large member of the panel should be elected by the
Council" 3 requiring both a majority of the pro rata votes in favor of the
candidate and a majority of the financial support of the organization.
In order to lend some consistency to the panel's decisions, panel members
should be elected for seven year terms with one panel member being replaced
each year.'35 Once a person is named to the panel, removal should be allowed
only on a super-majority vote by the Council based both on a pro rata and a
financial contribution basis. In a situation where a party in the dispute at issue
has a national on the panel, that panel member should be excused from ruling
on that dispute, and a temporary replacement should be chosen by the remaining
panel members.
The procedure used by the panel should be well defined. Procedure similar
36
to that of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
137
the International Chamber of Commerce, the United Nations Commission

132. Non-members should have the option of submitting to the jurisdiction of the panel for any dispute
to which they are a party and which arises from agency action.
133. See infra part V.B.15.
134. For the at-large spot, sitting members of the panel would each nominate one person. However, no
nation should have more than one member on the panel.
135. It is likely that resolution of some disputes would last several years. In cases where a dispute is
before the panel at a time when a panel member is to step down, that member should be required to conclude
that case before leaving the panel.
136. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
137. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration. See generally THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 233-82 (1984).
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on International Trade Law Arbitration,'3 8 or the American Arbitration
Association 39 could be adopted. All decisions should be made by a majority
vote. The law to be applied should consist of agency regulations, agency
agreements, and the ISA treaty, as well as customary international law and the
general principles of law of civilized nations."4 In cases where all parties to
the dispute are either the agency itself, members of the agency, or their nationals,
the decision of the panel should be final and binding. In cases where nonmember governments or their nationals are before the panel, appeal should be
allowed to an arbitral board. Enforcement, where necessary, of panel decisions
could be accomplished by requiring ISA members to accede to the New York
Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 141
One final dispute resolution problem arises. It would be likely that a nonmember nation injured by agency action would not submit to agency jurisdiction.
It should be anticipated that non-members would make their claims in an
international arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice.'4 2 In such
a case, the agency should be required to attempt to intervene in place of the
member or should be committed to indemnification of the member to the extent
that member would not have to bear the burden of liability under the ISA Treaty.
15. Suspension of Privileges
In the event of a dispute arising within the agency, the suspension of
privileges should be permitted as a method of ensuring compliance with agency
programs. The conditions leading to suspension should include, among others,
failure to meet the financial contribution requirement, failure to conduct the work
of the agency's programs, and violations of the ISA Treaty or regulations. The
progression toward suspension should begin with an opportunity for the member,
upon notice, to correct the deficiency within a reasonable time. If the deficiency
continues, in the case of minor violations, the member's voting rights in the
Council could be suspended until the member's obligations are met. In the case
of major violations the agency could terminate the transfer of information to the
member until the situation is corrected. Only in the most serious cases should

138. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98,
U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17.
139. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1992).
140. This would nearly adopt the same sources of law as used by the ICJ. ICJ Statute, supra note 49, art.
38. Obviously, any agreements between the agency and a member or between members would have to be
included as sources of law, as well as any agency regulations laid down by the Council. Because the dispute
resolution panel would also have authority over disputes involving individuals arising in connection with
agency actions, the applicable law would also include a minimum of private law. Thus, there exists the need
for customary international law and general principles of law. More stringent private legal standards should
be established by the Council because stricter requirements could otherwise be a substantial obstacle in the
formation of the ISA Treaty.
141. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
142. The ICJ would be available to non-member nations who make their claims against member nations
rather than the agency itself. See ICJ Statute, supra note 49, art. 34.
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the agency completely suspend a member from the agency. The complete
suspension of a member should be initially decided by the dispute resolution
panel. However, due to the severity of the penalty, complete suspension should
also require a super-majority vote of the Council based on both pro rata votes
should be dealt with
and financial contribution. In such a case, the suspension
43
as an involuntary withdrawal and as a withdrawal.
16. Amendments and Ratification
The final matters that should be dealt with in the ISA Treaty would be the
process of amendment and entry into force of the treaty. Amendment of the
treaty would be necessary for the agency to evolve over time.'" Any potential
amendment could be proposed by a national representative or by the Agency
Director subject to approval by the Council. As with other significant acts
within the agency, approval of an amendment should require a super-majority of
both the pro rata votes and the financial contribution shares. The amendment
should enter into force at the end of the first fiscal year after the approval of the
amendment.
Ratification and entry into force of the ISA Treaty would be the final
provision needed to complete the treaty. After the preparation of the treaty,
ample time should be allowed for domestic ratification under a given member's
foreign relations law. The treaty should enter into force one year following the
signing or, if required, the ratification of the treaty by five of the nine space
powers. The delayed entry into force allows ample time for the member nations
to make preparations for domestic implementation.

VI

OTHER ACTIONS INCIDENT TO FORMING AN

ISA

This comment addresses the reasons for broad international cooperation in
space and the major issues which must be addressed in drafting a treaty forming
a worldwide space agency. These questions alone, however, do not even begin
to scratch the surface of all the matters that must be covered to form and operate
such an agency.
Once the ISA Treaty comes into being, before the operation of the ISA can
begin, several hurdles must be cleared. The location of the ISA headquarters,

143. See supra part V.B.12.
144. Perhaps more than any other area of science, aerospace technology has developed at an astounding
rate. While the Chinese experimented with rocketry as long ago as 1232, modern rocketry did not come about
until Robert Goddard developed liquid-fuelled vehicles in 1926. MAN INSPACE, supra note 10, at 11-14. The
first airplane flew in the early twentieth century; less than forty-five years later, man was walking on the
surface of the moon. Id. at 74. Flight has gone from a novelty to a fact of everyday life. Spaceflight, not just
beyond the earth, but also flight regimes such as that of the Orient Express, will surely follow the same path.
The ISA must be structured to deal with the inevitable evolution of space research.
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the election of officers, Council representatives, dispute resolution panel
members, and the definition of initial rules of operation are all matters which
would have to be addressed. Once these are in place, the agency's budget
process could be initiated. The agency could begin obtaining properties from
members, obtaining control over space projects currently being conducted by
members, and expanding the rules of procedure governing the agency's
operation. Also, any privileges and immunities beyond those in the ISA Treaty
would need to be developed.
Once the agency begins making plans for the future, one of the most
difficult tasks would be the consolidation of duplicative projects. Should the
ISA proceed with the National Aerospace Plane project of the United States, the
French Hermes project, or the British HOTOL project? 45 Which nation's
Mission to Mars project should be continued, that of the United States or that of
Russia? t46 In the area of manned space stations, should the multinational
147
Space Station Freedom be given preference over the Russian Mir?
The agency would also need to immediately attack the problem of the
deficiencies in current space law. A consolidation of the various treaties defining
space law would have to be modified to reflect the presence of the ISA, and the
ISA would be forced to tackle the unresolved legal problems surrounding space
activity. Finally, the agency would have to establish the regulations governing
the procedure of the agency and the regulations governing persons under agency
control. "4
These steps alone, with their complexities, could last several years. Thus,
once the preparatory program of the agency has been laid out, it should be
expected that the agency would not begin effective operation for at least four or
five years.

VII. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

The domestic implementation of the treaty would be the cornerstone of the
ISA. t49 In order for such a broad multilateral organization to operate effectively, a nation signing the ISA Treaty should be bound to take such domestic action
as would be necessary for that nation to fulfill its membership obligations.

145. MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 234.
146. Id. at 230, 232.
147. Id. at 228-30, 232.
148. For an excellent discussion of the legal problems which must be addressed, see Harry H. Almond,
Jr., Standardized Terms and Conditions and the Implementation of Common Objectives in Outer Space,
PROCEEDINGS ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 11, at 3-12. Even the definitions of the terms of the
prior space treaties are subject to dispute. See Stephen Gorove, Major Definitional Issues in the Space
Agreements, PROCEEDINGS ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 11, at 76-79.
149. This issue would have particular importance in the context of the budget process. See supra part
V.B.6.
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Addressing this commitment in the ISA Treaty would greatly facilitate the
formation of the ISA by making each member's obligations clear and by
eliminating any opportunity for a nation to back out under a claim of inability
to meet the treaty obligations at the domestic level. 50 Such a binding
provision would instill confidence among agency members in each other's
dedication to the agency, confidence which would be critical to the success of
the agency.
Furthermore, many nations currently engaged in space activities have broad
pieces of legislation covering such activities. This domestic legislation is beyond
the scope of this comment, but as an example, the United States has legislative
provisions dealing with the space program covering remote sensing, 5 '
intellectual property, 152 commercial launch activities,5 3 space trade and
cooperation,"
international cooperation, 5 5 appropriations, 56 expenditures
157
and contracts,
TDRS use," 8 biomedical research, 5 9 and the various
6
Not only would such domestic legislation have to be
launch systems."
reconciled with the aims of the ISA, but additional legislation would likely be
needed to implement the aims of the Treaty.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Though it may seem that the Golden Age of space exploration has drawn
to a close, the future holds wonders even greater
than the Voyagers' tour of the
62 and small space stations. t63
solar system,' 6' manned moon landings,

150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 18, 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (the U.S.
has not signed the Vienna Convention but has accepted it as a statement of customary international law).
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 5621-5625 (1988).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2454-2457 (1988).
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5808, 42 U.S.C. § 2465, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2623 (1988).
154. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5871-5874 (1988).
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451, 2471-2472, 2475, 2484 (1988).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2459-2459(a), 2460 (1988).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2459(c)-(d), 2473(b) (1988).
158. 42 U.S.C § 2463 (1988).
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2487(a)-(g) (1988).
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2464, 2464(a), 2465(a), 2465(d)-(e), 2466(b)-(c) (1988).
161. Voyagers I & H conducted a grand tour of the outer planets leaving Earth in 1977 and concluding
when Voyager II passed Neptune in 1989. Voyager II has been given a new mission name, the Voyager
Interstellar Mission, as it races toward the edge of the sun's magnetosphere (the edge of the solar system].
MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 162-66.
162. The Apollo lunar landirigs began on July 20, 1969 when Apollo 11 touched down in the Sea of
Tranquility. The sixth and final manned lunar mission, Apollo 17, left Taurus-Littrow on December 14, 1972.
KERROD, supra note 22, at 63, 248-49.

163. The United States Skylab project was no more than a minor stint in the space station field. The entire
project consisted of only three crews, the first one arriving on May 25, 1973 and the final one leaving the
station on February 8, 1974. Id. at 249. The nations of the former Soviet Union have far more experience with
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Coming astronomical and interstellar research will continue to feed the voracious
appetites of the scientists and the hobbyists.' 64 As mentioned earlier, the
multinational Space Station Freedom is one of the banner projects of the near
future. The largest technological leap since the United States Apollo project will
lead to the most thrilling achievement, the National Aerospace Plane.165 A
return to the moon opens up the possibility of a new resource base,166 as well
as a jumping off point for interplanetary travel.' 67 The next step, of course,
would be the highly touted Mission to Mars. 168
Perhaps, the most important mission of all however, will be the Mission to
Planet Earth. The objective will be to provide a better understanding of our
home planet, which all too often we forget is an interstellar body itself. 69 The
principal aspect of this mission will be the utilization of remote sensing. 7 °
Zero gravity laboratories may yield dividends in areas including materials
processing and biomedical research. 17 1 Other projects in the Mission to Planet
Earth include expanded and enhanced global telecommunications and improved
meteorological systems.
Clearly, man has not exhausted the capacity of space research to yield
17 2
rewards, not only of a purely scientific nature, but also of future spin-offs.
Thus, it is imperative that mankind continue its attempt to unravel the mysteries
of the unknown.
Most of the world's nations are in no position to take these next steps in
space exploration alone. However, with the changing political structure of the
space stations from their Salyut and Mir programs. MAN INSPACE, supra note 10, at 100-09, 146-49, 174-85.
164. The Galileo project, which will drop a probe into the Jovian atmosphere in 1995, is in route to Jupiter;
Ulysses is on a mission to the sun; a mission to Saturn and to Cassini is planned for 1997; and the Hubble
Space Telescope, with its recently installed "contacts", will allow man to see to the edge of the universe. MAN
IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 156, 170-73. See also David L. Chandler, Shuttle Sends Repaired Hubble on Way
Mission Accomplished, Astronauts Turn Over Telescope to Ground Scientists, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1993,
at 8.
165. The National Aerospace Plane, in one incarnation commonly referred to as the Orient Express, would
takeoff from a conventional runway, whisk passengers from New York to Tokyo in two hours, and land on
a conventional runway. Another version would be a single-stage-to-orbit launch vehicle. George A. Keyworth
& Bruse R. Abell, How to Make Space Launch Routine, TECH. REV., Oct. 1990, at 24.
166. See KAUFMANN, supra note 85, at 211-13.
167. Among the advantages of using a lunar base as a jumping off point for interplanetary travel include
the reduced energy needs to reach the lunar escape velocity [which is less than 25% of the earth's escape
velocity] due to the lesser lunar gravitational force. See JOHN D. ANDERSON, JR., INTRODUCTION TO FLIGHT
411 (2d ed. 1985). The decreased amount of energy needed to get a given vehicle into orbit allows the vehicle
to carry a greater payload.
168. In 1993, a summit was held in Wiesbaden, Germany to discuss international cooperation between the
U.S., the former Soviet Union, Japan, and the ESA as it relates to the mission to Mars. Craig Covault, Mars
Exploration Invites Global Space Cooperation,AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 12, 1993, at 56-57.
169. MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 232-33; Christine Nielsen & Dirk Werle, Do Long-Term Space
Plans Meet the Needs of the Mission to Planet Earth, SPACE POL'Y, Feb. 1993, at 11-16.
170. MAN IN SPACE, supra note 10, at 232-33; Nielsen & Werle, supra note 169, at 11-16.
171. A 1992 space shuttle mission carried a pharmaceuticals experiment which achieved results in two
weeks that would have taken two years to produce on Earth. Daniel S. Goldin, Space Station: Build It for
America, WASH. POST, July 28, 1992, at a19.
172. Spin-offs is a term of art used to refer to second generation products and processes with applications
outside the space program which have their genesis in space technology.
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world, this inability to act in space can be circumvented. The western nations,
the United States, Japan, members of the European Space Agency, and others,
along with the eastern nations, China and Russia, as well as its former territories,
satellites, and neighbors, have at last reached a point where they can come
together in the area of space research.
Such a cooperative effort would have wide ranging benefits. It would lead
to increased financial and intellectual resources, therefore decreasing the
duplication of effort and promoting the efficient exploration of space. However,
the biggest benefit would be that space would truly be opened up as the province
of all nations. Nations which have been denied access to space would have the
opportunity to place their needs on the space agenda. Finally, the information
and technologies from the space program could be distributed worldwide in an
effort to further the lot of all mankind.
The process of establishing such an agency would be fraught with obstacles.
Aside from the negotiation of the ISA Treaty, problems would arise at the
domestic level and at the international level in terms of conflicting treaties.
However, such difficulties are substantially outweighed by the need for and the
benefits from an international space agency.
One of the great advocates of international cooperation in space, on
pondering the wonders that lay before mankind, has had the following to say on
the subject:
In putting forward this proposal, we proceeded from the premise that all peoples,

all mankind, are concerned with the task of exploring outer space and putting it to
peaceful uses and that the gigantic scale of this task, and the difficulties which have
to be overcome, make it imperative for States to pool their scientific, technical and
material ability and resources to a considerable extent. Even now ....

it can be

seen how much man has to accomplish.
If today the genius of man has created space-ships capable of landing on the
surface of the moon with the greatest accuracy and carrying ... astronauts into
orbit around the earth, tomorrow space vehicles controlled by man could travel to
Mars ... , and as they go further, man's prospects of penetrating the farthest
reaches of the universe will become greater and vaster.
The exploration of space in the interests of all mankind will be more rapid the
greater the number of countries making a contribution to this very complicated task,
which also involves considerable expenditure. And this means that all States should
be given equal opportunities to take part in international co-operation in this
field.' 73

Nikita Khrushchev
March 20, 1962

173. This quote is taken from a letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President John F. Kennedy reprinted
in NICOLAS M. MATrE, SPACE POLICY AND PROGRAMMES TODAY AND TOMORROW 139-40 (1980).

19941

FINAL FRONTIER

For the sake of mankind, let us hope that in the intervening thirty
years we
74
have learned the crucial lesson required for the conquest of space.
ChristopherL. Brinkley

174. The author would like to thank Professor Karl Bergey, ret. of the University of Oklahoma, Department
of Aerospace, Mechanical, and Nuclear Engineering for fostering and developing the author's love of the
aerospace field. More importantly the author would like to point out that such love has not been lost, in spite
of leaving engineering and going on to law school.

